Durbin proposed to deny Federal Aviation Administration funds to any and all airports that accommodated planes on which smoking was permitted.
The politics that ensued has since attracted journalistic and scholarly attention that yields important insights into the complex interplay of procedure, partisanship, preferences, and leadership in the legislative process (Chipello, 1992; LaRue and Rothenberg, 1992; Pytte, 1989; Shipan, 1995; Starobin, 1987) . Recounted in detail elsewhere, the basic chronology of the smoking ban was as follows. Public Works members anticipated the jurisdictional raid and tried to abort it, but the raiders were insistent on bypassing the authorizing committee. The Appropriations subcommittee, too, seemed opposed to Durbin's amendment and appeared to exercise its gatekeeping authority by voting 5-3 against the amendment. But this was not the end of the matter. The full Appropriations Committee also considered and defeated the smoking-ban amendment on a convincing 23-11 vote. Still undeterred, however, backers of the initiative fought to bring the issue to the floor. Appealing to the House Rules Committee, Durbin eventually earned the right to propose the ban as an amendment to the appropriations bill. Though resisted by high-ranking leaders and key committee members, the amendment was ultimately adopted on a vote of . When the larger appropriations measure was passed by a margin of 282-108, the smoking ban was well on its way to becoming law.
The broad substantive focus of this paper is on the fit between numerous existing theories of legislatures and legislative politics itself. The narrower but closely related empirical concern is whether inferences drawn in previous case studies of smoking-ban politics can withstand more comprehensive empirical scrutiny. Section 1 therefore introduces three families of theories that have significant predictive potential in the case: committee power, leadership, and median voter theories. This multitheoretic approach expands the range of feasible empirical tests beyond that in previous studies of the smoking ban.
Section 2 revisits and refines the roll-call voting analyses of previous studies. Four potentially significant differences are featured: a broader range of theories that suggest ways to interpret the data; collection and use of additional measures that seem better able to capture legislators' preferences and positions; use of an estimation technique that allows for a check on a suspected endogeneity problem in explanatory variables; and explicitness about assumptions that are essential but usually left unstated in empirical analyses of this form. This revised approach has an undesirable but addressable short-term consequence. The set of inferences is mixed relative to those drawn in earlier studies of the smoking ban, and confidence in the inferences may be further eroded by having identified the previously unstated assumptions that underlie roll-call voting studies of this sort.
As a response to strong but explicit assumptions and newfound substantive ambiguities, Section 3 expands the analysis to address many of the limitations of exclusively roll-call approaches. By observing more broadly the congressional history of authorization-appropriation disputes similar to the smoking-ban case, and then by looking more narrowly at the previously ignored Rules Committee stage of the case, additional and more conclusive evidence can be brought to bear on various theoretical frameworks. This added leverage comes from the fact that, at these additional stages (legislative history broadly, procedural choice narrowly), different theories provide distinctly different testable predictions.
Although it is mostly left implicit, a methodological issue is also pervasive in the various observations and interpretations concerning the fit between legislative theories and legislative politics. Do case-specific analyses of this form have ramifications for improved legislative research beyond the case at hand? Section 4 presents an argument that they do, but the argument is modest. The claim is not that case studies are substitutes for large-// studies. Rather, the essay seeks only to demonstrate that case studies can be opportunistic complements of large-iV studies. This is particularly true at critical junctures in a field, such as legislative studies, that is at once blessed with and cursed by an abundance of otherwise hard-to-test theories. Thus, if cases such as the smoking ban are identified in which measurement can be conducted more satisfactorily than under large-N research designs, behavior can be observed that is not ordinarily observable, and/or predictions of sometimes compatible theories diverge, then researchers should seize the opportunities posed, even though the generality of findings in case studies can and should be questioned.
Theories
Three families of positive theories of legislative politics can be brought to bear on the smoking-ban case: committee power, leadership, and median voter. Each family has several member theories that tend to offer similar predictions, but this tendency is imperfect. Thus, it is beyond the scope of this study to test exhaustively all member theories within any given family. Instead, I focus on specific members that provide relatively precise predictions for the case at hand. It should be understood at the outset that, upon assessing these predictions, interpretations necessarily come in the form of support or refutation of the family member, not its entire family. The following summaries clarify these distinctions. Committee-power theories generally identify parliamentary or procedural conditions under which members of standing committees can act to pull policy outcomes toward their own preferences.
1 A specific committee-power theory that relates clearly to the smoking-ban case is Denzau and Mackay's (1983) well-known gatekeeping theory (see also Ferejohn and Shipan, 1990; and Snyder, 1992) . This model assumes that a standing committee has the parliamentary authority to unilaterally enforce an exogenously given status quo point Its basic result in a unidimensional setting is that such a committee cannot be made worse off with respect to the status quo-that is, policies never gravitate toward the median voter's ideal point against the committee's wishes. 1. Accordingly, the theories have substantive bite only to the degree that committee and chamber preferences diverge significantly. As a matter of course, such divergence is an assumption-not a derivation-in this family of theories. While a sizable and controversial literature has arisen addressing the tenability of this assumption, it is not essential to address this literature here.
2. Several sibling theories also obtain this basic result even in multidimensional settings. For
Leadership theories generally postulate that majority-party members delegate special parliamentary authority to leaders, who in turn exercise their parliamentary rights to solve collective-action problems (Cox and McCubbins, 1993) . Given their party's advantage in numbers, majority-party leaders adopt various organizational forms that, in total, confer disproportionate benefits to the majority. Analogous to committee-power theory, biases in policy that favor the majority party necessarily come at the expense of the median voter of the entire legislature.
3 Specific leadership and party theories form a diverse family in legislative studies (see also Dion and Huber, 1996; Rohde, 1991; and Sinclair, 1983, 1992) . A practical consequence of this diversity is that the predictions of leadership theories tend to be ambiguous on a case-by-case basis, particularly when theorists concede that leaders sometimes choose not to employ their parliamentary prerogatives. Rohde, for example, proposes a theory of "conditional party government" in which the requisite condition for leadership strength is for the majority party to have homogenous preferences on the issue at hand. If this condition is not met-as seems true in the smoking-ban case-then the theory is silent and thus cannot be tested. In contrast, LaRue and Rothenberg embrace a notion of majority-party leaders as enforcers of procedural arrangements that make nonmedian outcomes possible, and they do so specifically for the smoking-ban case. Thus, consistent with several empirical works discussed below, this member of the leadership family of theories is the focus of this analysis.
Median-voter theories generally offer the prediction that outcomes in a unidimensional space will coincide with the most preferred position of the median voter (Black, 1958 ). This expectation is obviously different from committeepower and leadership theories at the level of outcomes, but what about processes and organizational forms, which tend to be more easily observed and measured than outcomes? In legislative applications of median-voter theory, the concept of chamber control over procedural arrangements is key (see, for example, Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987, 1990) . 4 Legislative median-voter theories postulate that the parent chamber as a whole (analytically, its median voter) is the entity that forms committees, allocates resources, and chooses rules. Corresponding predictions have the common feature that preferences alone-not partisan, committee, or leadership attributes-govern behavior in the domains example, Shepsle and Weingast's (1987) ex post veto model is essentially a post-floor version of gatekeeping as otherwise portrayed in a simpler committee-floor setting. Romer and Rosenthal's (1978) setter model applied in legislatures relies on a closed rule to achieve a compatible substantive result.
3. For many or most configurations of preferences, the directional policy-bias predictions of committee-power and leadership theories are identical, thus making it difficult to discriminate between the two theories. Such will be the case here. Still, the mechanics of the theories are different in important respects.
4. Unlike Black's, these theories generally are based on an assumption of an incomplete information. However, when uncertainty goes to zero in the theories, the resulting special cases are quintessentially median-voter theories with endogenous choice of procedures by the chamber median voter. of procedural choice and policy choice. In other words, median outcomes result because the chamber median-not a committee or party leader-retains control over outcome-relevant procedures such as junsdictional arrangements and parliamentary rules. Of course, common features can be noted across as well as within families of theories: for example, single-peaked preferences, rationality, and collective choice via majority voting. To focus on similarities and ignore differences, however, would forgo an opportunity for learning more about factors that are and are not first-order determinants of legislative behavior. Figure 1 therefore summarizes differences spatially in a manner that is later verified as empirically consistent with preferences in the smoking-ban case. The Public Works Committee indeed appeared to be a preference outlier in the case; majority-party leaders' preferences were left of center but right of committee; and the median voter's estimated ideal point was rightmost of the three points.
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Although spatially the smoking-ban case seems to be a good one for discriminating between different theories, there are obstacles. Testing spatial theories of legislative choice is necessarily indirect if the location of the outcomes in the policy space cannot be observed or estimated.
6 Accordingly, indirect tests are the norm. For the smoking-ban case in particular, prior analyses have focused exclusively on the final roll-call vote on the floor of the House. LaRue and Rothenberg, for example, estimated a logit equation in which constituency characteristics are proxies for preferences, and committee dummy variables denote members' stakes in the existing committee system. Finding that committee 5. The data analysis supporting these assertions is presented in Section 2. The Appendix provides details on how estimated ideal points were computed.
6. In some special cases-namely, when quantitative information on bill attributes is availablesuch bill placement is possible (Krehbiel and Rivers, 1988) but controversial (Wilkerson, 1991; Poole and Rosenthal, 1991) . coefficients were significantly different from zero on the committee dummies, they conclude:
... members of Congress who are at the margin will take institutional considerations into account in ways that may alter policy outputs. This, in turn suggests that a border exists that policy entrepreneurs will hesitate to cross when it comes to disregarding jurisdictional boundaries Analysts must be sensitive to the fact that institutional factors may play a role when members make their choices. (LaRue and Rothenberg, 1992: 314) Upon further inspection, some limitations to this form of analysis can be identified. The upshot is that the support for the institution-based, committeepower family of theories is less conclusive than it first appears. We nevertheless begin by analyzing the vote before moving to other forms of behavior that are more amenable to discriminating tests.
Analysis of the Vote
Following LaRue and Rothenberg (1992) and Shipan (1995) , the dependent variable in the first stage of analysis is a legislator's vote on the Durbin amendment to H.R. 2890, the annual transportation appropriations bill. A yes vote is a vote for the smoking ban and is coded 1. A no vote, coded 0, is a vote for the relatively pro-tobacco status quo. On the surface, the standard setup for roll-call vote analysis seems straightforward. It turns out, however, to be the first step toward inferential difficulties, unless initial attention is given to some theoretical details. As noted above, by the time the vote occurred a key assumption of the gatekeeping theory had been violated: two standing committees tried but failed to exercise their presumed gatekeeping authority. Thus, if we are not to reject the gatekeeping theory on these grounds alone, then a more lenient approach is to concede this violation but to assert that the case is atypical from the perspective of procedurally deferential behavior toward committees. In other words, the case must be viewed as an instance of legislators straying off the equilibrium path on which gatekeeping is usually respected. Then the crucial empirical question becomes whether, once off the equilibrium path, legislators play the kinds of punishment strategies that are necessary to sustain deferential equilibria in future instances of committee-floor disagreement.
Although conceptually this approach takes a significant step forward, it is still not data-ready. The problem is that even with this off-the-equilibrium-path construction, additional assumptions are necessary to interpret the findings with reference to the gatekeeping theory specifically or committee-power theories more generally. The point of departure in this study is not in the making of such assumptions but rather in making them explicit.
Assumptions
First, roll-call voting analysis in this context must assume that a violation of a procedural norm has taken place. This assumption is charitable to the gate-keeping theory in the following sense. It portrays the undisputed failure of committees to exercise effective gatekeeping power not as refutation of the theory but rather as an invitation to consider the hypothesis that what is a formal assumption in this theory (exogenously granted gatekeeping authority) is an equilibrium within some larger unmodeled game.
7 Guided by this assumption, the empirical analysis proceeds with a focus on punishment that must arise in the policing of behavior that is errant with respect to this overarching norm-like equilibrium.
Second, it must be assumed that if punishment takes place to restore the norm as an equilibrium, such punishment will take place on the vote in question. If this is not assumed, then it would be essentially impossible to reject the theory. Null findings could always be explained away with reference to other forms of hypothetical punishment, and thus the test would have little or no power.
Third, it must be assumed that those who administer the punishment against norm-violating jurisdictional raiders are those who have the most to gain from deference-based (apparent) gatekeeping authority or, more generally, from the institutional status quo. If this kind of assumption is not made, then essentially any pattern of coefficients can be interpreted as evidence of punishment by given groups, and, as above, the test would have little or no power.
The stringency of these assumptions is obvious, and no heroic attempt is made here to defend them. Indeed, the first part of the analysis is intended to show that even in the presence of necessarily strong assumptions, roll-call voting analysis is nevertheless inconclusive once theories outside the committee-power family are considered.
Measures
If preferences play a central role in legislators' voting decisions-and none of the theories discussed holds otherwise-then votes should reflect a mix of constituency-induced preferences, interest-group-induced preferences, and personal preferences. Given measures of preference attributes, the next step is to include variables related to institutional positions so that institutional effects can be assessed, too. Borrowing somewhat but also departing significantly from previous studies, the following explanatory variables are used. 7. See Diermeier (1995) for a formal theory in which deference to committee arises endogenously in a repeated-play setting rather than being postulated as an assumption as in the one-shot gatekeeping theory.
8. 1 am indebted to Larry Rothenberg for sharing his data. Of the variables in his data set, the two used in the main analysis here are tobacco production and rural composition (see below). Additionally, following Shipan, I investigated comprehensively but here summarize only briefly results based on other dummy variables pertaining to institutional position (e.g., substantively related subcommittees) and leadership status (committee chairs, ranking Republicans, whips, party leaders, seniority). Likewise, I reconsider and summarize the nullified effects of variables used in previous analyses of this vote (e.g., honoraria from the Tobacco Institute, education, party, ACLU ratings).
Constituency Influences.
Male smokers is the percentage of males in the legislators state who smoke. Its expected sign is negative. That is, as values of this variable increase, a legislator's probability of supporting the ban (voting yes) should decrease.
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Female smokers is the percentage of females in the legislator's state who smoke. While its expected sign is also negative, it is noteworthy that the correlation between male and female smokers in a state is only .43. Since the preponderance of frequent flyers are males, legislators are expected to be disproportionately responsive to the percentage of male smokers in their state.
State smoking limits refer to the number of types of public places in which a state's laws restrict smoking (e.g., schools, restaurants, public buildings). As such, this measure reflects broad constituency attitudes toward smoking as manifested in state law and should have a positive coefficient.
Tourism is the percentage of the state's gross economic product due to tourism. Correctly or not, it was widely believed in 1987 that a smoking ban would have a negative effect on tourism, 10 so this coefficient should be negative.
Tobacco production is the amount of tobacco produced in a legislator's district. Its coefficient should be negative.
Rural composition is the percentage of the district classified as rural. Interpreted as a measure of the unimportance of air travel in the district, the coefficient for this variable should be negative because the preponderance of airline passengers favored the ban.
2.2.2
Interest-group-lnfluences. Tobacco PAC money is thousands of dollars received by the legislator from tobacco political action committees in 1987-88. Its coefficient is expected to be negative. Since this variable may be endogenous that is, PAC contributions may be rewards for, rather than stimuli of, votes-I present instrumental-variables maximum-likelihood estimates as well as more conventional probit estimates.
Personal Preferences.
Tobacco user is a dummy variable coded 1 if the legislator smokes or chews tobacco according to the Coalition on Smoking or Health.
Institutional position.
Public Works is a dummy variable for membership on the authorizing committee whose jurisdiction was allegedly raided in this 9. As a measure for "distribution of smokers in district," LaRue and Rothenberg and Shipan used average state education, on the assumption that education and smoking arc negatively correlated. The actual correlations between education and female smokers (-.11) and education and male smokers (-.39) are sufficiently weak that the more direct smoking variables seem preferable to education for investigating this issue.
10. For example, a Northwest Airlines spokesman said that when Northwest extended the twohour ban to all its flights in 1988, "a lot of airlines thought it was a mistake" (Chipello, 1992: C9) . legislative history. Committee-power theories imply that this variable should have a negative coefficient.
Appropriations is a dummy variable for membership on the House Appropriations Committee, which stood to benefit from expansion of its jurisdiction if the raid is successful. Accordingly, committee-power theories predict a positive coefficient. However, the leadership theory may hold that as "institutional maintainers," Appropriations members will administer punishment, in which case the prediction is a negative coefficient." 2.2.5 Leadership Position. Dummy variables for each of the following were also used: Democratic chairs (chairmen or chairwomen of standing committees), top Democrats (the six Democrats with elected leadership positions), Democratic whips, Democratic leaders (chairs and whips), members of the Steering and Policy Committee, and chairs and ranking Republicans combined. According to the leadership theory, coefficients for these dummy variables should be negative.
Findings
The vote-based findings are summarized in Table 1 . The first two columns are results from two-stage tobit estimation, 12 and the third and fourth columns are probit estimates. Since these two sets of results-and several slightly different specifications not reported here-are stable, and probit coefficients are relatively easy to interpret, most of the inferences that follow are based on the probit estimates. It should be noted, however, that while endogeneity of PAC contributions seems not to be a major problem, the probit estimates tend to be larger when endogeneity of PAC contributions is not considered. Thus, probitbased inferences about the magnitude of effects of exogenous variables may be somewhat inflated.
For a large majority of variables, coefficients are statistically significant and of the expected sign. 13 Substantive significance of most of the coefficients is 11. The sign of this coefficient is discussed in detail below. 12. Two-stage tobit estimation (Lee, 1981) is conceptually analogous to two-stage least-squares estimation and, in the maximum likelihood framework, to two-stage, conditional maximum likelihood estimation (Rivers and Vuong, 1988) . In the first-stage tobit equation, the dependent variable is tobacco PAC money, whose predicted values are used in a second-stage probit equation in which the dependent variable is the vote on the Durbin amendment. In addition to all variables in the second-stage probit equation, the first-stage tobit equation included the following variables that collectively identified the equation: National Farmers Union ratings, dummy variables for various leadership or jurisdictionally relevant committees and subcommittees (Rules, Ways and Means, Agriculture, Health subcommittees of Energy and Commerce and Ways and Means, the Aviation subcommittee of Public Works, and the Tobacco and Peanuts subcommittee of Agriculture), dummy variables for membership in various leadership groups (elected Democratic positions. Democratic whips, committee chairs and ranking minority members, Steering and Policy Committee), plus party, house seniority, electoral margin, and, most significantly for identification purposes, total PAC receipts.
13. The exception is the positive coefficient for female smokers. The expectation that it is smaller than its male counterpart is borne out; however, its positive sign does not have a ready explanation. apparent as well. For the one-stage probit estimates, probability calculations are given for the increment or decrement associated with a perturbation of single independent variables by a standard deviation (or a unit for dummy variables), when other independent variables are held constant at their mean values (or modal values in the case of dummy variables). Presented in the last column of Table 1 , these range from fairly small, as in the cases of female smokers (.09) and tourism (-.07), to huge, as in the case of tobacco production, where a standard deviation increment reduces the probability of supporting the ban by .78. The genera] thrust of these calculations is consistent with the common view that, other things equal, legislators are more responsive to well-organized or intense interests in their constituencies (here tobacco interests both at the district level and via PAC money) and less responsive to more diffuse interests (e.g., broad constituency opinion as measured by state smoking limits and male smokers). It is also noteworthy that personal smoking habits have a strong independent probabilistic impact. Other things equal, an average tobacco user's probability of opposing the ban was .34 less than that of a nonuser.
When the variables used in LaRue and Rothenberg's study are added to the equations in Table 1 , each coefficient is insignificant. With prior analysts' interpretations given in parentheses, these include: ACLU ratings (called "ideology" and classified as "consumer interests"), agriculture committee membership (given a propensity-to-logroll interpretation and classified as a "producer interest"), party (classified as "consumer interests"), airline passengers (called "role of airline industry" and categorized as "producer interests"), and average education level in the district (called distribution of smokers in district" and categorized as "consumer interests"). The null hypothesis of jointly zero coefficients for these variables cannot be rejected (p = .45); thus the effects identified previously can be questioned. In comparison, the estimates in Table 1 seem sufficiently robust to warrant proceeding with them as we relate the new findings to multiple theories.
Theory-Relevant Inferences
The crucial question from the perspective of committee-power theories generally is whether committee membership has a bearing above and beyond the preference effects that are now well-established in three studies. As in earlier studies, the first-pass answer is yes. The negative coefficient for Public Works members is consistent with the gatekeeping theory. According to the theory, victims of the jurisdictional raid have the most at stake in preserving the institutional status quo and therefore are more inclined than others to attempt to inflict punishment on the raiders of their jurisdiction. Given the assumptions in the test, this is a strong finding and sound inference.
However, a closer look is in order. The coefficient for the turf-raiding committee-Appropriations-is also negative. This runs contrary to committeepower theories generally, which uniformly hold that jurisdictions and procedural protections (gatekeeping, closed rules, ex post vetoes, etc.) are the core features of an institutionalized legislature. Self-interested committees should aggressively pursue jurisdictional expansion and procedural protection.
14 Controlling for preferences, however, Appropriations members seem to have done the opposite; they attempted to inflict punishment on those smoking-ban proponents who encouraged expansion of the Appropriations Committee's jurisdiction. 15 Thus, in contrast to LaRue and Rothenberg's conclusion, this more explicitly punishment-based interpretation yields only mixed support for the gatekeeping theory specifically or committee-power theories more generally.
Do leadership theories clarify the issue? Interestingly, although it was not an explicit part of LaRue and Rothenberg's econometric analysis, leadership played a salient role in their interpretations favorable to committee-power theo-14. The fact that Appropriations members appeared not to favor the ban based on votes in committee does not change this prediction; it merely changes its policy rationale. If the appearance comports with reality, then Appropriations members with gatekeeping power should seek jurisdictional expansion in order to preserve the status quo.
15. Subcommittee-specific analysis was also conducted for the Public Works Aviation Subcommittee and Appropriations Transportation Subcommittee. Substitution of these subcommittee dummy variables for their respective full committee dummy variables yielded null results, with /-statistics of only .88 (wrong sign) and -.80, respectively. This means that if institutional effects are genuinely at wort, then they curiously shut down at the subcommittee level. Similarly, the equation was reestimated after adding dummy variables for three other subcommittees that arguably were in raid predicaments similar to Public Works and its Aviation Subcommittee. In the cases of the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Health, the Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, and the Agriculture Subcommittee on Tobacco and Peanuts, potential if not actual jurisdictional wounds were likely to have been salted, too, given the tobacco and health ramifications of the Durbin amendment. Yet neither individually nor jointly do these variables yield significant coefficients. This would seem to heighten the possibility that both the Public Works coefficient (not replicated for its Aviation subcommittee) and the Appropriations coefficient (not replicated for its Transportation subcommittee) should be attributed to something besides punishment.
ries. This was Shipan's motivation for conducting a follow-up study attempting to bolster the interpretation that leaders act to enforce and preserve procedural arrangements from which committees and/or the majority party derive power. His search was exhaustive and his findings were predominantly null. To confirm that Shipan's findings are not peculiar to his use of LaRue and Rothenberg's measures and econometric specification, a similar search was conducted using these data and adding to the equation leadership variables similar to Shipan's. The general thrust of the findings is consistent with Shipan's study. Dummy variables for the top six Democratic leaders, 16 committee chairs, Democratic whips, the Steering and Policy Committee, Democratic chairmen and ranking Republicans, party, seniority, and all of the above collectively, failed to yield significant coefficients. Within the confines of this specific test, then, support for the theory of leaders as enforcers of procedural arrangements does not exist.
The results in Table 1 are not amenable to a direct test of the median-voter theory. However, two weak, theory-relevant observations can be made. First, the fact that most of the preference variables are significant and of the expected sign indicates that preferences alone account for considerable variation. This is broadly consistent with the median-voter theory. But second, the sparse version of the theory-essentially truthful revelation of primitive preferences given a pair of alternatives-implies that both committee and leadership coefficients should be zero. In the case of leadership, this prediction is borne out. In the case of committee membership, it is not. So the support for median voter theories generally is much like that for the gatekeeping theory specifically: mixed.
In summary, in contrast to the confident vote-based inferences drawn in prior studies of the smoking ban, the view here thus far is considerably more clouded, due to the introduction of alternative theories and the different perspectives they offer for interpreting the findings. Some unexplored paths may lead us out of the current inconclusiveness, however. Recall again the assumptions formerly implicit but now explicit in roll-call vote analysis of this sort. First, violation of a norm of respect for gatekeeping has taken place. Second, if punishment takes place to restore the norm as an equilibrium, it will take place on the vote in question. Third, punishers are those who have the most to gain from the institutional status quo. These assumptions are sufficiently strong to cause discomfort among many observers of legislative politics. Thus, the next step-while unique in studies of this sort-is crucial. Within the context of this case history, and without ignoring the previous empirical foundation, can we find supplementary testing grounds for various members of the committeepower, leadership, and median-voter theoretical families? Or, more to the point, what facets of legislative behavior besides a single roll-call vote can be observed that do not require the strong assumptions associated with roll-call vote analysis?
Supplementary Analysis
LaRue and Rothenberg claim support for institutional or committee-power theories in spite of the negative sign of the coefficient for Appropriations membership. Although their interpretation is different from that made above, their position is defensible. Their defense follows and reiterates the close alignment the committee-power and leadership families of theories.
Apparently, [Appropriations] committee members were determined to penalize Durbin for making an end run around the committee system, even though the eventual result would be to expand Appropriations' jurisdiction. To reiterate, leadership opposed the amendment; for Appropriations members to encourage encroachment on the authorization committee's domain could be viewed as a violation of the implicit contract defining the committee system and could invite the leadership to respond accordingly.
(LaRue and Rothenberg, 1992: 313, emphasis added)
Implicitly, this interpretation draws upon several seminal works in legislative studies. Appropriations members are portrayed as institutional maintainers (Mayhew, 1974 ) who, while not exactly guardians of the public purse (Fenno, 1966) in this regulatory issue, are nevertheless sensitive to their committee's special role within the legislature. Indeed, according to LaRue and Rothenberg, it is because of the position taken by leaders that appropriators punish one of their own members for violating "the implicit contract denning the committee system." This interpretation is not only consistent with the prereform classics of Fenno and Mayhew, but it also captures the essence of several insightful postreform studies that articulate the core argument of the leadership theory (Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991; Rohde, 1991; and Sinclair, 1992) . The drawback of this interpretation, however, was first identified by Shipan and is reinforced here. While plausibly called in as an interpretive device, this version of leadership theory is lacking in independent support, at least via roll-call voting analysis. To reiterate, various sets of leaders were not more inclined than nonleaders to punish the raiding committee, controlling for preferences.
With two defensible but opposite interpretations of the Appropriations coefficient available, what can be done? If additional analysis is to be helpful, it seems increasingly clear that such analysis should be based on more than a single roll-call vote and the necessarily strong assumptions required for interpreting it. Two such opportunities are explored. First, we seek guidance from a broader slice of congressional history than the smoking-ban case. Second, we seek guidance from a narrower, pre-voting slice of the smoking-ban case itself. In each form of supplementary analysis, the issue is whether independent support exists for the leadership interpretation of the committee-membership effect. In the second instance, an additional concern is whether positive and unique support can be found for chamber-control versions of median-voter theory.
A Historical Perspective
As noted in a recent and illuminating study by King (1996) , jurisdictional turf wars are anything but new in the House of Representatives. Of special interest to the present case is the historical pattern of House Appropriations Committee members in terms of jurisdictional raids. Is their history one of institutional maintenance a la Fenno, Mayhew, and implicitly LaRue and Rothenberg. Or is it more a history of jurisdictional imperialism at the expense of gatekeeping and other supposed procedural rights of authorizing committees? Three facts are suggestive.
First, Fenno's and Mayhew's depictions of the Appropriations Committee were period-specific, and the relevant period predates the congressional reforms of the 1970s. Second, an extensive literature on the House Appropriations Committee since Mayhew's and Fenno's classic works argues that significant changes have occurred since the reforms. The consensus view seems to be that the committee members have undergone a transformation from "guardians" (Fenno) to "claimants" (Schick, 1980) . Third, the general and intense budgetary pressures that persisted through the 1980s regularly pushed authorizing committees out of the budgetary loop. According to one account, "Congress has enacted fewer authorization measures each year. Some programs have been extended, and changed, with authorizing language inserted into appropriations bills, transferring great power from authorizers to appropriators" (Haas, 1988: 17) . While it is impossible to quantify precisely the nature of this jurisdictional encroachment by the Appropriations Committee, the following observation is highly suggestive: only 21 percent of domestic discretionary spending subject to annual authorizations for fiscal year 1987 in fact received a separate authorization bill. 17 Thus, by these historical accounts, the jurisdictionally rigid committee system generally portrayed in committee-power theories in reality has been violated regularly. Appropriations members in recent decades are more likely to be jurisdictional raiders than institutional maintainers, and raids invariably entail violations of so-called gatekeeping powers. As such, the leadership-based, institutional-maintenance interpretation of the Appropriations coefficient seems problematic. Moreover, even if by some objective criterion LaRue and Rothenberg's interpretation is deemed right, then this would seem to be an instance of winning a battle but losing the war. That is, a hybrid theory of committee power backed by majority-party leadership as enforcers may provide a good account for the politics of the smoking ban. But, if so, then it also provides a bad account of postreform congressional appropriations history generally.
17. Citing the Congressional Budget Office, Haas (1988: 18) writes: "While more than 15 percent of domestic discretionary spending was subject to annual authorizations for fiscal 1987, separate authorizations were enacted for only 3.2 percent of total spending."
Rules Committee Behavior
The chief drawback of the median-voter family of theories thus far is that its predictions have not been sharply discriminating with respect to gatekeeping and leadership theories. Preference effects of the sort found in Table 1 are consistent with all three families. Needed, then, is a legislatively nonobvious median-voter prediction that sets these theories apart from the leadership and committee-power theories.
A fertile but unfilled testing ground can be found in the House Rules Committee. This committee plays a central role in many committee-power and leadership theories (see especially Dion and Huber, 1996) . Yet, amazingly, it has played no role in previous and otherwise thorough case studies of the smoking ban. Three basic facts lay a useful foundation for further analysis. First, the Public Works Committee was predisposed to killing Durbin's amendment-relatively speaking, in terms of preferences alone, and absolutely speaking when institutional concerns are also factored in. 18 Its gatekeeping efforts, however, were unsuccessful. Second, institutional concerns aside, the Appropriations Committee was mildly predisposed to passing the ban. But it twice (first in subcommittee, then in full committee) voted by majority not to add Durbin's amendment to H.R. 2890. Its gatekeeping efforts, however, were doubly unsuccessful. Third, the next stop for H.R. 2890 was the House Rules Committee. What did the Rules Committee do, and which, if any, theories accurately predict its members' behavior?
The academic backdrop for answering this key question is as follows. In research on the prereform Congress, the Rules Committee is regarded as the quintessential gatekeeper of the House (Jones, 1968; Kravitz, 1965; Robinson, 1963; Cummings and Peabody, 1977) ." The more recent and not incompatible conventional wisdom is that the Rules Committee serves as a "dress rehearser," "traffic cop," or, more generally, "arm of the leadership" (Oppenheimer, 1981) . 20 In 1987 the Democratic numerical advantage on the Rules Committee was nine to four, as it was through the 103rd Congress. This ratio is significantly more biased toward the majority party than that of any other standing committee in the House. Furthermore, rules changes in the 1970s amplified the Speaker's role in the appointment of Rules Committee Democrats. According to most accounts, not since the partisan era of Czar Reed and Boss Cannon had such authority over Rules been delegated to the Speaker of the House, and Democratic Speakers seem less than shy about flexing their procedural muscles. A recent session of the Joint Committee on the Organization of 18. See the Appendix for a description of the method used for extracting estimated ideal points from the roll-call voting findings.
19. See Dion and Huber (1996) for a formal model that embodies this conventiona] wisdom. See also Krehbiel (1995) for a reinterpretation of Dion and Huber's data in light of a formal model that does not embody this conventiona] wisdom and is compatible with the median-voter perspective taken here.
20. See also Bach and Smith (1988) , Cheney (1989) , Plattner (1985) , Ronde (1991) , and Sinclair (1983, 1994) .
Congress, for example, revealed the following: David Drier, a California Republican who is a vice chairman of the committee, complained that the Democrats had stacked the Rules Committee with a 9-to-4 majority to prevent Republicans from adding amendments to bills supported by the Democratic leadership. Speaker Thomas S. Foley of Washington responded by telling the panel, "We don't even attempt to be fair in apportioning the Rules Committee. ("Lawmakers Convene Committee on Change," New York Times, January 27, 1993, A14).
In light of these views, the postreform Rules Committee seems uniquely capable of preserving the committee system as it is portrayed in committee-power theories and of doing so in a manner that is consistent with leadership theories. Implicit sanctions, outright obstruction via refusal to grant a rule, or granting a restrictive rule that precludes an anticipated jurisdictionally illegitimate amendment are just some of the many weapons in its procedural arsenal. To see how can these can be tailored to the present case, consider three hypothetical Rules Committee roles and their corresponding actions specific to the smoking-ban case:
Role I: Gatekeeping agent oj'the leadership. The Committee could exercise de facto gatekeeping authority in any of at least three ways: by refusing to grant a rule for the appropriations bill; by proposing a closed rule for the bill, thus protecting it from all amendments; or by simply ignoring the Durbin amendment but thereby leaving it vulnerable to a point of order against clause 2 of Rule XXI, which precludes authorizing language in an appropriations bill.
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Role 2. Passive agent of the House. The Committee could propose that clause 2 of Rule XXI be waived for the Durbin amendment. This would turn the issue over to the House, which would then decide, by majority vote, whether to accept, reject, or amend the Rules Committee's resolution providing for consideration ofH.R. 2890.
Role 3. Active majoritarian facilitator. The Committee could hear arguments on the Durbin amendment and expressly provide for its consideration over the objections of the Public Works and Appropriations committees.
The first hypothetical role is consistent with the specifics of gatekeeping theory and with committee-power theories more generally. It is also consistent with many broad claims of majority-party leadership theories. 22 The second 21. There is a hint of evidence that the bill was not clearly vulnerable to such a point of order (Starobin, 1987) . However, Durbin was sufficiently worried about such vulnerability that he aggressively pursued a waiver.
22. For example, Cox and McCubbins (1993: 270) write: "The picture of the postwar House ... is one in which the majority party acts as a structuring coalition, stacking the deck in its own favor-both on the floor and in committee-to create a kind of 'legislative cartel' that dominates the legislative agenda. The majority party promotes its agenda-setting advantage in two basic ways: by giving its members greater power to veto legislation; and by giving its members greater power to push legislative initiatives on the floor." For comparable excerpts, sec Rohde (1991) and Dion and Huber( 1996). hypothetical role is consistent with the median-voter theory in a weak form. The Rules Committee simply facilitates orderly consideration of alternatives but does not attempt to bias outcomes away from the median baseline as in, say, majority-party leadership theories. The third hypothetical role is consistent with more conspicuously chamber-control versions of median-voter theory. The Rules Committee takes positive and nonpartisan steps to facilitate passage of bills that it perceives to be congruent with chamber-median preferences.
As the case unfolded, the Rules Committee bypassed procedural option 1 entirely, even though, consistent with the top four Democrats' apparent wishes, 23 any of these procedural strategies would have accomplished what Public Works wanted done and what the Appropriations full committee and subcommittee tried but failed to do-namely, defeat the smoking ban by acting out the gatekeeping role as prescribed by committee-power theories. From all indications, however, the gatekeeping role was never contemplated seriously by most Rules members. Only Representative James Quillen of Tennessee, an extreme tobacco preference-outlier within Rules, tried to stop Durbin, and he was the first to admit to the House that his efforts were futile (Congressional Record, July 13, 1987, H-6168-9) .
Although the Rules Committee did adopt procedural option 2, it did so perfunctorily en route to option 3. That is, having proposed a waiver on a point of order on clause 2 of Rule XXI, the Committee proceeded to expressly confer on Durbin the right to offer his amendment on the floor. Indeed Durbin's amendment was written into the rule itself.
24 So, rather than serve as an obstructive arm of the leadership, the Committee was the very antithesis of gatekeeper. It actively facilitated Durbin's soon-to-be-affirmed majoritarian cause, and it did so in spite of putative leadership opposition and/or procedural objections by affected committees.
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Reinforced by the House's ultimate passage of the Durbin amendment, these facts about the Rules Committee's behavior in the aggregate are inconsistent with the gatekeeping and leadership-as-procedural-enforcer theories. Strong 23. The adjective "apparent" is nontrivial. In constructing their strong-leadership interpretation of their results, LaRue and Rothenberg make a subtle inference about leaders' policy preferences from their roll-call votes. This should no more be done, however, than making inferences about Public Works members' policy preferences based on their roll-call votes. In either case, institutional or leadership effects-if real-render the inference suspect.
24. See Sec. 2, H. Res. 221, 100th Congress. 25. The replay of the smoking-ban saga in 1989 provides further indirect support for medianvoter theory. In his quest to make the initial two-year ban permanent, Durbin in 1989 bypassed both Public Works and Appropriations under the expectation that he would again be allowed to offer the ban as an amendment to the annual appropriations bill for transportation. Remarkably, however, the procedural initiators in 1989 were tobacco-state members. Knowing full well of their minority status on this issue and wanting to avoid another embarrassing floor defeat, pro-tobacco members requested from Rules that Durbin's amendment be included in the bill in such a way as to avoid a direct floor vote altogether. This request was granted by Rules, after which the House, by adopting the rule, automatically and simultaneously adopted the permanent ban (Pytte, 1989) . As in the 1987 case, the House prevailed. Unlike the 1987 case, pro-tobacco representatives were so grateful to avoid a floor showdown that they initiated the self-executing procedure.
positive support for the chamber-control version of median-voter theory is still needed in the form of individual-level preferences and behavior, however.
In a classic study of legislative leadership, Jones (1968) argues that there are circumstances under which behavior differs depending upon whether procedure or substance is overriding. Jones's procedure-substance distinction is useful here, too. In spite of the Rules Committee's supposedly Speaker-selected Democrats 26 and its nine-to-four Democrat-to-Republican ratio, the implication of median-voter theory is that the procedural function of the Rules Committee is to be responsive to the House as a whole rather than to some mix of the hearts and minds of the Democratic Party. In the context of most leadership theories, this is a striking and nonobvious prediction. Luckily, it can be considered at both aggregate and individual levels of analysis. The aggregate implication of this prediction is that when confronted with information that suggests that the status quo policy may be out of equilibrium with respect to the House's median voter, the Rules Committee collectively will turn things over to the House. This much has been confirmed already. We therefore turn finally to two further implications that are testable via individual-level data. Following Jones, they are both procedural and substantive in tone.
(i) Procedure. When discharging their majoritarian, procedural function, individual Rules Committee members have an obligation to uphold their committee's work-that is, to vote for the rule they crafted. Consequently, several members opposed to the substance embodied in the rule-namely, banning smoking on airlines-are predicted to vote for the rule.
(ii) Substance. Having discharged their procedural obligations, members of the Rules Committee should not act any differently from other legislators. Preferences alone should determine their voting behavior on the Durbin amendment itself.
Notice that while the first hypothesis may be consistent with a theory that portrays leaders as enforcers of pro-committee or pro-party parliamentary arrangements, the second hypothesis clearly contradicts most such theories. Had prior analysts of the case considered the Rules Committee, they must have predicted that the Rules Committee, as arm of the leadership, would vote against the amendment in order to punish the violators of "the implicit contract"
The rule was adopted by the House by a vote of 198-118. Table 2 provides strong support for both procedural and substantive predictions, as stated above. While four Rules members missed this roll call, only one of the remaining nine voted no: Representative Quillen of Tennessee, the strong pro-tobacco crusader who with futility had opposed Durbin in the Committee's hearing. The median-voter theory is therefore supported at this stage of procedural choice. However, this prediction may be consistent with leadership theory, too. What of the comparative predictions surrounding more conspicuously substantive behavior?
26. The Democratic Caucus ratifies the Speaker's selections and they arealsosubjecttoa majority vote of the House. Proponents of the conventional wisdom regard these steps as pro forma, however. 
a See Appendix for description of how these points were cataiated
When the House took up the appropriations bill and Durbin exercised the amendment right that he was expressly conferred by the rule, all but 1 of the 13 Rules Committee members cast votes. These have several theory-relevant properties. First, the vote was clearly not partisan, contrary to what an arm-ofthe-Speaker view of the Rules Committee would suggest. Indeed, the Speakerselected Democrats split 6-2 in favor of the ban and, implicitly, in favor of the jurisdictional raid. Second, consistent' with the median-voter-based prediction, the Rules Committee no longer came out united as it had on the vote on the rule itself; the Committee's final tally was 6-6. Finally, and most importantly with respect to nonpartisan chamber-control versions of median-voter theory, estimated preferences predict individual votes perfectly. The ordered, estimated ideal points for the Committee show a perfect cutpoint between supporters and opponents of the amendment. Everyone whose estimated probability of supporting the ban was less than .5 opposed it; everyone whose estimated probability of supporting the ban was greater than .5 supported it. In summary, individual-level predictions based on preferences alone are corroborated, while predictions based on the postreform descriptions of the Rules Committee, on most committee-power theories, and on LaRue and Rothenberg's version of leadership theory, are refuted.
Discussion
The smoking ban has proved to be a rich case for quantitative case studies. Three sets of researchers have now focused on its politics, and each has portrayed its findings in a significantly different light. LaRue and Rothenberg view the case as providing evidence of institution-based committee power in which procedural arrangements are enforced by leaders. Shipan views it as providing evidence of committee power without statistically significant leadership backing. I view it as providing stronger evidence for chamber-control extensions of medianvoter theory than for any other theory or family of theories. Although this is a straightforward summary, not all the smoke has cleared from the case. For instance, two committee coefficients still await an explanation that does not pick and choose from available theories in an ad hoc manner. More generally, how useful are quantitative case studies of this form, when, and why? A standard criticism of case studies is that there is no assurance that the findings engendered therein are general. The issue is not whether this criticism is valid-it is, of course-but rather what to do about it. One response is to refuse to conduct case studies because of inescapable doubts about generality. Another response is to do them more carefully because of such doubts. The implicit but obvious view of LaRue and Rothenberg, Shipan, Riker (1986) , Jones (1968) , Huitt (1961) , Hansen (1991) and countless others is to opt for the second approach. What, then, are the conditions under which case studies are uniquely desirable methods for legislative research? A discussion of three increasingly important conditions makes a case for case studies.
Condition 1: The case involves nontrivial political tension-that is, different actors have different preferences and care enough about the issue to use resources at their disposal to shape the outcome of the case.
Condition 2: Something about the case poses unique opportunities for measurement of theoretically relevant phenomena that would be difficult or impossible to measure in a large-A' study.
Condition 3. Different theories with different case-relevant predictions can be brought to bear on the analysis in a manner such that comparative hypothesis testing can occur even under the rubric of case analysis.
The first condition speaks for itself and is rarely violated by case researchers. The second condition, as a practical matter, is probably what draws quantitatively oriented researchers into the case-study fray. Specifically, opportunities to obtain better than customary measures of preferences and to observe a wider range of possibly unusual behavior essentially allows an otherwise conventional narrative to develop into research in which theoretically derived hypotheses can be tested quantitatively and perhaps more rigorously than is otherwise possible. While subjectivity is not eradicated, at least some objectivity is gained. Confidence in inferences is gained, too, in rough proportion to the degree that the assumptions required for inference are explicit and reasonable, and to the degree that the null hypotheses that are rejected have prima facie plausibility. Would critics of case study methods argue that such opportunities should be forgone? If not, then case studies should be viewed not as substitutes for large-N studies but rather as much needed complements of such studies.
The third condition defines a bonus situation for case analysis. In instances of real political conflict (condition 1) and fortuitous measurability (condition 2), the prospect for learning is further enhanced when different theories imply different things about the behavior that can be observed, measured, and subjected to hypothesis tests (condition 3). Thus, for instance, the unique substantive inferences in this study stem not only from improved measures but more fundamentally from condition 3 having been met. Granted, costs as well as benefits are associated with testing multiple theories. When three families of theory rather than one or two are considered, unqualified support for any single family or member is improbable. But the benefits may well offset the costs if joint consideration of several theories accentuates their comparative strengths as well as weaknesses.
In conclusion, the realistic objective in case-study research is not that any single theory account for every single observation. Rather, it is that the collection of theories under consideration in the literature more broadly improves as a consequence of exposure to more detailed scrutiny than large-N studies afford. In all likelihood, a case study that meets the three conditions is a case study that facilitates long-term theoretical progress.
Appendix: Estimation of Ideal Points
The significance and robustness of the probit estimates in Table 1 provide a solid foundation for calculating estimates of legislators' ideal points on a smoking-ban dimension. The underlying probit equation is Pr(Vote = 1) = <i>(x'/3 + y'y), where <t > denotes the cumulative normal distribution function, x' represents all but the committee and leadership dummy variables, / represents the committee and/or leadership dummy variables that have been interpreted as allowing for institutional and/or leadership effects, and p" and y are vectors of maximum likelihood coefficients to be estimated. For purposes such as that summarized in Figure 1 , we need estimates of ideal points that are devoid of intralegislative pressures attributable to leadership and/or institutional positions. More specifically, we want a number for each legislator / that is calculated as a function of x' t fi but not y[y. The procedure is transparent. We calculate raw estimated ideal points jc,'p\ one for each legislator-"raw" because the units of this measure have no intrinsic meaning beyond their ordinal property. Recall, however, that in Figure I we are interested only in the ordering of medians of theory-relevant groups, so this rawness is not a problem. For Public Works, Democratic leaders (whips and committee chairs), and the House, the median jcJ/Js are 0.197,0.283, and 0.419, respectively. For other purposes, such as the Rules Committee analysis, a probabilityscaled measure that lies in the (0, 1) interval is desirable. The measure <t>(jc,' /3) is useful here because it has an intuitive interpretation as a legislator's predisposition to favor the smoking ban given his or her unique constituency and persona] characteristics but excluding institutional or leadership pressures, if any. (In this case, there are none, statistically. Because no Rules Committee members are Appropriations or Public Works members, y^y = 0, V/ e Rules.) Given the coding of the dependent variable, legislators with 4>(JC,'J8) > .5 are favorably predisposed to banning smoking on airlines while, conversely, legislators with <b(x'jP) < .5 are predisposed to support the status quo. These measures are listed for Rules Committee members in Table 2 .
